Extending Agents by Transmitting Protocols in Open Systems by de Silva, Lavindra et al.
Extending Agents by Transmitting Protocols in Open
Systems
Lavindra Priyalal de Silva
RMIT University,
Melbourne,
Australia
ldesilva@cs.rmit.edu.au
Michael Winikoff
RMIT University,
Melbourne,
Australia
winikoff@cs.rmit.edu.au
Wei Liu
University of Western
Australia, Perth,
Australia
wei@csse.uwa.edu.au
ABSTRACT
Agents in an open system communicate using interaction protocols.
Suppose that we have a system of agents and that we want to add a
new protocol that all (or some) agents should be able to understand.
Clearly, modifying the source code for each agent implementation
is not practical. A solution to this problem of upgrading an open
system is to have a mechanism that allows agents to receive a de-
scription of an interaction protocol and use it. In this paper we pro-
pose a representation for protocols based on extending Petri nets.
However, this is not enough: in an open system the source of a pro-
tocol may not be trusted and a protocol that is received may con-
tain steps that are erroneous or that make confidential information
public. We therefore also describe an analysis method that infers
whether a protocol is safe. Finally, we give an execution model for
extended Petri nets.
1. INTRODUCTION
An intelligent agent is situated, reactive, proactive, autonomous
and social [9]. The social ability of an agent is exercised in a
multi-agent system, which constitutes a collection of such agents.
A multi-agent system where agents are created by different organi-
sations using possibly different agent architectures is often termed
an open system. For example, the Agentcities network.
Open systems introduce issues for agents that want to communi-
cate. For example, issues of privacy, where an agent should ensure
as much as possible that its privacy1 is not jeopardised in commu-
nicating with another agent. Safety is another issue whereby an
interaction should not require an agent to expend an unreasonable
amount of resources for example.
Agents use interaction protocols to communicate with one another.
If an agent’s designer knows all the possible interaction protocols
required for a new agent, the agent can be designed with the ability
to communicate using this fixed set of protocols. This however
stops agents in an open system from learning new protocols. The
inability to learn also enforces a static open system that cannot be
upgraded, for example by adding a new protocol.
We adopt the solution of agents communicating by transmitting in-
teraction protocols. We fill in the gap in earlier research by provid-
ing a mechanism for transmitting protocols in the light of the above
issues that open systems introduce. Firstly we propose a represen-
tation of interaction protocols to be transmitted, as extended Petri
Wei Liu was at RMIT at the time this research was carried out.
An agent’s need to keep certain information from being revealed
to other agents.
Nets2. Next we propose a method to analyse protocols received by
another agent to check if they are adoptable (in terms of privacy,
safety etc.), and finally an execution model for extended Petri Net
protocols is proposed.
Consider the following example. A new agent A is created for an
open system. As a requirement, A searches for online auctions that
sell laptops and finds agent B who is an auctioneer selling laptops.
A decides to communicate with B, and uses a generic ‘request-
reply’3 protocol to request from B a suitable protocol so that A can
participate (bid) in the auction. On this request, B realises that A
is an agent that wants to enter the auction and sends A a bidding
protocol in a Petri Net representation. A can now use the bidding
protocol, but not before making sure it is safe to do so. For ex-
ample, if the protocol requires A to send a message to B with A’s
credit card number before bidding for an item, A will decide not to
use the protocol. If the protocol seems to be safe, A will execute
the bidding protocol which will result in it communicating with B.
Due to space limitations it not possible to present the full details of
this work in this paper. See [2] for more details.
1.1 Assumptions
In addition to the issues mentioned earlier, more basic but yet sig-
nificant issues exist in open systems, such as incompatibilities that
make it difficult for agents to communicate. Incompatibilities in-
clude different communication standards (such as FIPA or KQML),
issues with understanding messages sent to one another4, etc. To
work around incompatibility issues, we assume that all agents ad-
here to a common communication standard and are therefore able
to send messages to one another. Information received in a mes-
sage is assumed to be understood by an agent using ontology in-
formation available to that agent. Much work is being done in the
ontology area to support this. We also assume that all agents use
the same “language” for encoding message content, such as XML.
1.2 Related Work
Although transmitting protocols have been proposed in earlier re-
search [4, 5, 6], they were primarily for closed systems. Research
Refer to [8] for a detailed explanation of what Petri Nets are and
how they work. Since Petri Nets are used to represent interaction
protocols, we use the terms Petri Net and Protocol to mean the same
thing.
For our purposes, we assume that all agents in an open system can
understand a generic ‘request-reply’ protocol which will be used to
request for other protocols.
For example, one agent could be using LISP syntax for represent-
ing content in messages and another could be using Prolog.
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Figure 1: AUML protocol for multiple participants
such as [3] that had concentrated on open systems did not consider
the issues of privacy, safety, etc. – significant when using a pro-
tocol sent by another agent. Similarly, research (for example [1])
that focused on descriptive protocols and protocol transmission left
out issues arising as a result of this transmission, namely, issues of
privacy and safety.
2. REPRESENTING PROTOCOLS
In our research, protocols represent the interaction from a single
agent’s perspective, such as the bidder in the previous example. We
call such protocols “local” protocols. Local protocols differ from
“global” protocols, where the latter describes an interaction from
a global perspective. A global protocol for the previous example
include the interaction between the auctioneer, bidders and a pos-
sible supplier for example. Therefore according to our definition,
AUML5 represents protocols from a global perspective.
In addition to AUML, protocols have been represented using var-
ious notations [4, 5, 6] including Finite State Machines and Push-
down Automata, Dooley Graphs and Petri Nets. We have selected
the Petri Net notation to represent local protocols because of its
advantages over the other notations, such as the ability to repre-
sent concurrency in conversations. Refer to [7] for a comparison of
these different protocol representations.
In addition to protocols being “local”, we require protocols to be
complete. A protocol should have enough detail so that an agent
using it will know exactly what it needs to do at different stages
in the interaction. This is in contrast to AUML for example, which
does not capture internal processing. We have made protocols com-
plete by enabling the specification of actions for an agent at differ-
ent stages of an interaction. We have extended the basic Petri Net
model to be able to represent external actions; messages to send
and receive, and, internal actions; a specification of what functions
to execute, what variables to read and write to and what conditions
to test for.
An AUML protocol6 is shown in Figure 1 along with the corre-
sponding7 extended Petri Net protocol for the Personal Travel As-
sistant (PTA) in the AUML protocol. The Petri Net extends the
AUML protocol by adding internal processing details and defines
the interaction from the PTA agent’s perspective.
In the Petri Net, labels Recv and Send represent external actions,
Agent Unified Modeling Language: A derivative of UML (Uni-
fied Modeling Language). http://www.auml.org/
This AUML was created using the example at http
://www.fipa.org/specs/fipa00080/XC00080B.html (section 5.3).
The Petri Net represents our interpretation of the AUML protocol.
Start
Recv[R5,Accept−Offer,
Auctioneer,accept−details]
Recv[R4,Reject−Offer,
Auctioneer,reject−reason]
Send[S4,Bid,Auctioneer,results−of(A2)]
Recv[R3,CFP,Auctioneer,item−list]
Pred[results−of(A2)!=SATISFIED]Pred[results−of(A2)==SATISFIED]
Action[A2,execute,Makechoice(),
contents−of(R3)]
Recv[R1,Inform,Broker,"initiate"]
Send[S2,Inform,Auctioneer,"register"]
Recv[R2,Inform,Auctioneer,"finish"]
Figure 2: Petri Net protocol for the PTA participant
and Action and Pred represent internal actions. The values sep-
arated by commas next to each action specify arguments to that
action. The prototype or legal syntax for how and what values are
to be provided to actions is defined in the action’s template, and is
explained in sections that follow.
Pred[<Boolean−Expression>]
Action[<Act−Label>,<Type>,<Act>,<A−Content>]
Recv[<R−Label>,<Performative>,<Sender>,<R−Content>]
Send[<S−Label>,<Performative>,<Receiver>,<S−Content>]
2.1 Specifying Message Exchange
In our extended Petri Net notation, a specific message to be re-
ceived by an agent executing the protocol is described by a Recv
label. Recv labels are represented by Petri Net places. The agent
from whom a message is to be received is specified in the Sender
slot of the Recv. A Recv also requires other information such as the
R-Label which uniquely identifies a Recv label on the Petri Net, the
Performative of the message and the content of the message, which
can be specified if known or ommitted otherwise. Similarly, a mes-
sage to be sent by an agent will be specified in a Petri Net transition
using a Send label. The Send requires similar information to that
of the Recv. The S-Content in the Send can be used to specify a
known content, or whether the message’s content has to include re-
sults from a previously executed Action (see below). This is shown
on the Petri Net in Send: S4, where - refers to re-
sults from executing Action A2.
For example, the Petri Net in Figure 2 shows that the PTA begins
by receiving a message from the Broker agent with an Inform per-
formative (shown in the first Recv). It then sends a message to the
auctioneer with a “register” note in its content by using an Inform
performative.
2.2 Specifying Internal Functionality
The processing to be done involves function execution and reads
and writes to variables. By allowing the specification of function
executions and variable manipulations in protocols8 , ambiguity in
protocols that may lead to different interpretations of protocols by
different agents can be avoided.
The processing to be done is defined in Petri Net transitions using
an Action label followed by its values. The type of action (i.e. ex-
ecute for functions and read or write for variables) is specified in
the type slot. The name of the function to be executed or the vari-
able to be manipulated is specified in the Act slot. The argument(s)
to the function or value for variables is specified in the A-Content
slot. The A-Content slot can also be used to specify where (within
the Petri Net) to obtain values from. For example, the Petri Net di-
agram shows how Action A2 should obtain the argument(s) to the
Makechoice() function when it is made available in the message re-
ceived by the Recv labelled R3. The arguments to Makechoice()
will be included in that message. Once Makechoice() is executed,
its return value will be sent to the auctioneer in Send S4 with a Bid
performative as explained before.
We define predicates to be functions that return either True or False.
Predicates are used to test conditions when the protocol is executed.
Predicates are defined on transitions using Pred labels and prevent
transitions from firing if false.
3. ANALYSING PROTOCOLS
Going back to the example mentioned in section 1, when agent
B (the auctioneer) sends the bidding protocol to agent A, agent A
will analyse it by firstly, seeing if it conforms to certain syntax and
semantic requirements. Syntax checks are done to ensure that the
protocol adheres to the proper extended Petri Net format. Examples
include checking if the Petri Net begins with a place, ensuring that
a value in an Action label’s Act slot does not refer to a function that
does not exist, etc. All resulting invalid nodes9 after the syntax and
semantic checks are marked “unsafe”.
Next the Petri Net is checked for loops10 that lead to problems when
the protocol is executed. Finally, a check is made to ensure that the
protocol sent by B is not a threat to A’s privacy.
3.1 Protecting Private Information
The privacy of an agent is jeopardised if it has to release private
information by executing the protocol. By private information we
mean information belonging to an agent (or its user(s)) that the
agent does not want to reveal to all other agents, such as credit
card information, driver’s license etc.
An invasion of privacy becomes an issue when executing a received
protocol if the protocol is created by a remote, untrustworthy agent.
An agent that creates a protocol can, via Action transitions, poten-
tially execute any11 function, or, read or modify any variable in the
agent who executes that protocol. An agent could therefore exe-
cute a protocol that defines an Action and Send that would make
the agent read and send its driver’s license number to another agent
for example.
One way of protecting privacy is for each agent to maintain an ac-
The functions and variables of an agent will be defined in an on-
tology. Agents can therefore use this ontology information to ex-
change protocols with other agents that understand them.
Places and transitions
Omitted due to space constraints. Refer to [2] for details.
Within the constraints of the ontology
cess list, with information such as; which other agents are allowed
access to which variables and functions and what kind of access is
permitted (read, write execute). Action transitions can be analysed
with this information and unsafe Actions can be detected.
However, assigning fixed access permissions to functions and vari-
ables is not always feasible. Some functions and variables may
need to be allowed access at certain times but denied access at other
times. For example, a variable representing an agent’s credit card
number may need to be kept private by that agent until an item that
the agent buys with that credit card is delivered. More precisely,
conditions to allow an agent’s credit card number to be read (this
read is identical to paying for an item and can be called Pay) by
another agent are that, firstly, the protocol should specify that an
agent should want to buy an item before the item is paid for (call
this condition WantToBuyItem). Secondly the protocol should indi-
cate that at some time in the future, an item paid for will indeed be
delivered (call this condition Delivery).
WantToBuyItem and Delivery are preconditions to Pay. A precon-
dition is a condition that needs to hold before an action (or number
of actions) can be executed. For example, before paying for an item
we should want to buy the item. We identify two types of precon-
ditions: past and future. A past precondition is where the condition
is expected to hold at the time that the action is to be performed.
For example, wanting to buy the item before paying for it. A future
precondition is where the condition is not expected to hold at the
time that the action is to be performed. For example, paying for an
item before the item is received. In this case receiving the item is a
precondition since we do not want to pay unless we know that the
item will be delivered. However, at the time payment is made, the
item will not yet have been received. This issue is considered in
section 4.
We use Action Templates to define the past and future preconditions
for actions. Action Templates can be used with Petri Net actions to
ensure that the latter adheres to the necessary past and/or future
precondition(s). The Action Template for the previous example is
shown below. Pay represents the actions of paying for an item,
outgoing arcs are future preconditions and incoming arcs are past
preconditions. Delivery can either be a past or future precondition
and WantToBuyItem is the past precondition.
Pay
DeliveryWantToBuyItem
Delivery
Pay
WantToBuyItem
In our research, we have provided a mechanism to map an Action
Template to a specific set of actions in a protocol to check if the
latter are safe. A set of actions is unsafe if a past (or future) precon-
dition is defined for it on an Action Template which is not reflected
on the on the Petri Net. For further details, refer to [2].
3.2 Propagating Safety Information
At the completion of the stages of protocol analysis, the Petri Net
protocol may have some places and/or transitions marked “unsafe”.
Those nodes should be avoided when the Petri Net is executed. If
even one of those unsafe nodes cannot be avoided, the Petri Net
protocol simply cannot be used.
Inferring whether an unsafe node is avoidable or not is done by a
method we call Safety Propagation. In this method, given an unsafe
node, we “propagate” from that node to find other nodes that are
unsafe or unusable. During propagation, a node is marked unsafe
if its execution will result in the execution of the unsafe node being
considered. A node is marked unusable if it cannot be reached
as a result of a node that has been marked unsafe or unusable. If
the entire Petri Net or its initial place is unsafe or unusable, or if
all of the final places are unsafe or unusable, the Petri Net will be
rejected.
4. EXECUTING PROTOCOLS
If the protocol is not rejected, it will be executed. The execution
of a Petri Net is the movement of tokens from a place to another
connected place, as a result of transitions firing. Since our extended
Petri Net requires internal and external actions to be performed dur-
ing its execution, to deal with these, we have made minor modifica-
tions to the Petri Net execution model. Since some aspects of Petri
Net execution were covered in section 2, the next paragraph serves
as a summary.
During execution, a place that has a Recv label gets one token
placed on it whenever the appropriate message (as specified by val-
ues for that Recv) is received by the agent. A transition that has
a Send label sends the message described by its values whenever
that transition fires, which may also involve obtaining results from
a previously executed Action. A transition that has a Pred label
requires a change to the way that transitions usually fire. We re-
quire the predicate returning True to be an additional criteria for
that transition to fire12. A transition that has an Action executes the
internal action defined by its values before that transition fires and
will fire once the internal action has completed execution.
Additionally, the safety of a protocol is a characteristic that can
sometimes only be tested during execution time. For example, an
action cannot be considered safe if its future precondition is based
on a runtime factor such as the receipt of a message from another
agent, because, the action could be executed but the message re-
quired to satisfy its future precondition may never be received. This
reinstates the privacy issue discussed earlier since the agent may
release private information (in paying for an item for example) but
may not be sent the item afterwards. We provide a partial solu-
tion to this by requiring that agents request a guarantee from the
remote agent(s) to send the message(s) required to satisfy a future
precondition, immediately before the action (e.g. pay) to that future
precondition is executed13. If the future precondition is guaranteed,
the requesting agent will in turn execute the action. This is similar
to saying, “If I send you my Credit Card Number now, will you
promise to send me the Receipt (for the item bought) afterwards”.
No such guarantee is required for past preconditions since a past
precondition to an action will have already been executed when the
action is being considered.
We also provide a mechanism for the remote agent to infer whether
it can guarantee some other agent’s future precondition. The remote
agent does this by mapping a guarantee request received against its
own protocol to test if it can indeed send the message(s) requested.
If a guarantee cannot be sent, the protocol will be terminated (after
negotiation) by the agent requiring the guarantee.
In addition to all incoming places requiring at least one token on
them.
This is only a partial solution because an agent may guarantee the
sending of a message and may not send the message afterwards.
Research based on Trust Networks deals with such issues.
5. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
Due to time constraints, our work was mostly theoretical. The com-
pletion and integration of all the algorithms proposed into a system
that can transmit, analyse and execute protocols is left as future
work. Furthermore, the details of how a protocol that is relevant to
a given situation is chosen (see example in section 1), and a more
precise description of Action Templates is also left as future work.
In our research, we have presented a series of detailed requirements
for agents, to be able to transmit protocols in open systems. We
have considered issues such as privacy and safety that become sig-
nificant when a protocol received from an untrustworthy agent is to
be used. In order to use protocols, we have proposed a Petri Net
representation for them that can be analysed to deduce their safety,
and provided agents with an option to reject a protocol if it were
not safe. If the safety could not be confirmed during analysis time,
the agent is able to terminate a protocol during its execution if a
required guarantee(s) was not met.
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